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On his first presidential visit to Africa in October 2012, François Hollande proclaimed that 
“the era of what was called in the past ‘Françafrique’ had ended. There is France and there is 
Africa. There is a partnership between France and Africa, with relations based on respect, 
clarity and solidarity” (Hollande 2012). The supposed partnership also extended to the realm 
of security. France would not intervene directly in African crises, but rather help reinforce the 
capacities of Africans to enable them to take care of the crises themselves. Thereby, Hollande 
also identified France’s partners by commending the roles of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) in previous conflicts, and 
African armed forces in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Moreover, against the 
background of the unfolding crisis in Mali, he called for a solution in partnership with 
ECOWAS and the AU. Consequently, France’s future military presence in Africa was 
supposed to be more transparent and, ultimately, reduced (Hollande 2012). 
Eventually, however, the French intervened largely on their own in Mali, and were 
only later joined by forces from ECOWAS member states. Moreover, France has since even 
strengthened its military footprint on the African continent. This throws up the question of 
whether France is truly committed to an indirect military policy that leaves the stage to 
African actors. This apparent contrast between practice and discourse in France’s African 
military policy is not of recent vintage. The shift towards capacity-building, Africanization, 
and multilateralization has been professed, but not necessarily followed, by French 
policymakers since the late 1990s. President Hollande’s predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, also 
clearly voiced his preference and support for African peacekeeping solutions, which would 
avoid a direct involvement of French troops in African crises, and pre-empt accusations of 
neo-colonial aspirations. But in Sarkozy’s case too, this policy discourse did not necessarily 
align with reality. In 2011, the Ivorian post-electoral crisis saw a forceful French military 
intervention (Wyss 2013). 
It is important to emphasise that France’s defence policy and military interventions 
have almost exclusively focused on and been adapted to its pré carré of Francophone African 
states with which Paris has maintained privileged security relations since decolonisation. As a 
corollary, French interventions have not been primarily driven by a peacekeeping agenda, but 
have rather been influenced by France’s desire to maintain its influence, to protect its long-
term partners, and to pursue its economic and strategic interests in the region. While in some 
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cases this has helped to avoid further bloodshed, it is questionable whether the logic of 
French interventions is conducive to long-term stability in Africa (Powell 2016). Even though 
it is beyond the scope of this article to address this issue, it has to be borne in mind when 
assessing France’s peacekeeping partnership with ECOWAS. 
Meanwhile, France’s predominant role in recent African conflicts also seems to run 
contrary to international calls and African advocacy for ‘African solutions to African 
problems’. Since the temporary withdrawal of the great powers from Africa during the 1990s, 
African regional organisations have tried to take the security of their continent into their own 
hands. Supported by the international community, they have conducted their own peace 
operations, and thereby become peacekeeping actors in their own right (Williams 2008, 309-
314). ECOWAS has stood at the forefront of this development and, since the beginning of the 
1990s, has carried out peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte 
d’Ivoire (Obi 2009). As a result, ECOWAS has not only valuable experience, but also an 
increasingly sophisticated institutional infrastructure and framework to deal with crises in 
Africa. Moreover, the main regional protagonists in peace operations would still like to see 
more African ownership and, thereby, reduce their dependency on such external actors as 
France (Van der Lijn and Avezov 2015, 47-48). Consequently, at least in theory, ECOWAS 
would be an ideal partner for Paris to truly Africanize and multilateralize its military policy in 
Africa. 
Moreover, regional solutions seem to be particularly adequate, because despite their 
predominantly local origins, conflicts in Africa tend to have a regional dimension as a result 
of weak governments, porous and inadequate borders, as well as military inefficiency 
(Williams 2011, 41). These problems are partially the result of and are compounded by the 
fact that – in line with Frederick Cooper’s concept of the ‘gatekeeper state’ – many African 
states tend to be, on the one hand, prone to outside interference and influence, on which their 
rulers ultimately depend. On the other, the vying for the control of the gate, and the benefits 
that come with it, can lead to domestic instability and crisis, if not conflict (Cooper 2009, 
156-190). Yet while these weaknesses and vulnerabilities make regional solutions a 
prerequisite, they have also prevented the emergence of fully-fledged regional security 
complexes, as defined by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Nevertheless, in their view, West 
Africa forms a proto-regional security complex, not least because of Nigeria’s influential role 
and ECOWAS. But while the complex is clearly formed, security interdependence remains 
weak (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 219-224, 229-233). This has not prevented ECOWAS from 
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attempting, with mixed success, to transform the West African security complex into a 
security community, and thereby become a security actor in its own right. 
Against this background, this article aims to assess whether, to what extent, and why 
the theoretical convergence of France’s African security policy and the peacekeeping 
aspirations of ECOWAS does not necessarily translate into practice. This also entails the 
question of whether France, through its at times forceful interventions, pre-empts the 
peacekeeping efforts of ECOWAS or, rather, fills a gap where the regional organisation is 
unable or unwilling to intervene. These questions are not only pertinent in relation to the 
apparent divergence of policy discourse and practice, but also with regards to France’s and 
ECOWAS’ respective security roles in Africa. Despite decolonisation, France has retained a 
substantial military footprint and close security and defence relationships with most of its 
former colonies in West Africa. Since the late 1990s, these relationships have received an 
additional, a multilateral pillar, through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping 
Capacities (RECAMP) programme, for which ECOWAS has become an important partner 
(Charbonneau 2008, passim). There is thus an underlying security partnership between 
France and ECOWAS, which is supposed to enable the latter to fulfil its peacekeeping 
aspirations. 
Consequently, there seems to be not only theoretical convergence between French and 
ECOWAS peacekeeping policies, but also a cooperative basis in practice. Yet this article 
argues that convergence in practice depends on the nature of an individual crisis, as well as 
the political, strategic, and economic interests of both France and ECOWAS member states. 
In order to make this argument, this article will, firstly, sketch the evolution of France’s 
African security policy and ECOWAS’s peacekeeping record from the 1990s to the early 
2000s; secondly, examine France’s capacity-building efforts and support to peace operations 
in West Africa; and, thirdly, study the roles of France and ECOWAS in the Ivorian post-
electoral and the Malian crises, as well as the consequences for their security relationship and 
the African peace and security architecture. 
 
Theoretical Convergence 
At the theoretical level, France’s security policy towards Africa and the crisis management 
activities and ambitions of ECOWAS are perfectly complementary. On the one hand, the 
French have subscribed to multilateralism and the Africanization of security in Africa over 
the last two decades. On the other, since the early 1990s, the West Africans have increasingly 
addressed the crises in their region themselves. 
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France began to multilateralize and Africanize its African strategy in reaction to 
important shifts in the international system and Africa after the Cold War: France could no 
longer portray itself as the bulwark against Soviet expansionism (Chafer 2001, 173); 
increased globalisation diminished Africa’s economic importance; accelerated European 
integration and renewed transatlantic security cooperation reduced France’s political and 
military independence; direct military involvement appeared increasingly risky in light of the 
protracted nature of African conflicts; and France’s dominant role in francophone sub-
Saharan Africa was subject to mounting criticism, especially after its contested role in the 
Rwandan Genocide (Kroslak 2007). France thus increasingly cooperated with the 
international community on African security issues, and supported regional peacekeeping 
forces. Therefore, the number of French troops and bases in Africa was to be reduced (Chafer 
2002, 347-354). This did not mean, however, that France abandoned the unilateral pillar of its 
African strategy. The post-independence defence agreements remained in force, troops 
reductions were supposed to be compensated by professional rapid reaction forces, and Paris 
did not refrain from intervention if it considered its national interests at stake (Gregory 2000, 
442-445). After the end of the ‘cohabitation’ with the socialists in 2002, and in light of the 
spread of international terrorism and Africa’s economic resurgence, President Jacques Chirac, 
a staunch supporter of a strong French role in Africa, even reinforced the bilateral pillar 
(Hugon 2007, 57, 61, 66). France thus gave preference to multilateral and African 
frameworks but, if necessary, would intervene on its own. This new approach was almost 
immediately put into practice in 2002-2003, when France intervened in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo with its European partners, and in Côte d’Ivoire alongside ECOWAS 
(Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon 2007, 21). Although in the Ivorian case the French had first 
intervened independently (Charbonneau 2012, 513), they eventually teamed up with a partner 
that could at this stage already look back on a rather substantial peacekeeping record. 
ECOWAS played a pioneering role in regional peacekeeping in Africa. It was the first 
organisation to launch a major peacekeeping operation, to collaborate with the UN to address 
a complex emergency, and to establish a crisis management framework (Olonisakin 2011, 
12). Admittedly, these achievements should not distract from the political, military, and 
financial difficulties that ECOWAS has faced in addressing conflicts and deploying peace 
operations. Nevertheless, from an organisation that had originally been established in 1975 to 
promote regional economic integration and Nigeria’s hegemonic aspirations, it has evolved 
into an important security actor. Initially, this was rendered possible by the great power 
withdrawal from the African continent in the wake of the end of the Cold War, and Nigeria’s 
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willingness to shoulder the brunt of the cost of the peacekeeping force (Reno 2012, 178). In 
reaction to the Liberian Civil War, in 1990, a Nigerian-led coalition of the willing established 
the organisation’s first peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Monitoring and Observer Group 
(ECOMOG). Within the same decade, ECOMOG also intervened in Sierra Leone and 
Guinea-Bissau (Adebajo 2002). While Nigeria was absent in Guinea-Bissau, it provided the 
bulk of troops and finances in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOMOG was an opportunity for 
Abuja to assert its increasingly dominant role in West Africa (Véron 2006, 116; Perrot 2005, 
116). But ECOMOG operations suffered from a number of problems, which were related to 
political disagreements among West African leaders, institutional weaknesses, command and 
control, the lack of operational coordination, logistical shortcomings, and the behaviour of 
troops on the ground. The military shortcomings were particularly severe in Guinea-Bissau, 
where, in the absence of Nigerian firepower, ECOMOG failed to impose peace. This 
illustrated ECOWAS’s dependence on Nigeria’s military muscle for peace operations 
(Luntumbe 2013, 14-15), which could not be compensated by the indirect support of external 
powers, notably of France (Obi 2009). 
In response to its experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS 
began to reform its legal and institutional framework. But in the midst of this process, it was 
confronted first with renewed civil war in Liberia, and then with the outbreak of the Ivorian 
crisis. In Liberia, this led to the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) 
in summer 2003. ECOMIL lacked, however, the military capacity and capabilities to fulfil its 
peacekeeping role, and was rapidly absorbed by the much larger UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL). In the Ivorian case, after the decision in late 2002 to send a peacekeeping force to 
monitor the short-lived ceasefire it had brokered with the help of France, the deployment of 
the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) encountered significant delays, and only 
arrived on the ground in spring 2003. In the meantime, the peacekeeping role was shouldered 
by the French Licorne Force, which, based in Port Bouët, had been deployed immediately 
after the outbreak of the crisis to protect French citizens and interests. The French forces had 
first to step in to monitor the ceasefire, then to help ECOMICI to deploy and, finally, to 
provide it with logistical and operational support on the ground. Yet in order to gain 
international legitimacy, and reduce the cost of its involvement, France pushed in the UN 
Security Council for the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which eventually absorbed 
ECOMICI (Wyss 2013, 91-93). 
ECOMIL and ECOMICI were thus a forceful demonstration that ECOWAS lacked 
the logistical, human, material, and financial resources to conduct large-scale peace 
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operations. Meanwhile, for both missions ECOWAS relied on external support, from the UN, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and, notably, France (Elowson and MacDermott 2010, 
33). Moreover, in light of Nigeria’s increasing reluctance to shoulder the brunt of the burden, 
the role of partners has become increasingly important (Iwalide and Uchechukwu Agbo 2012, 
364). Consequently, the evolution of France’s African strategy on the one hand, and of the 
peacekeeping role of ECOWAS on the other, seems to have opened up an opportunity for a 
mutually beneficial partnership. 
 
Capacity-building and Operational Support 
The Africanization of France’s strategy and peacekeeping in Africa during the 1990s has 
added a multilateral dimension to the historically substantial cooperation between the French 
and African armed forces. This cooperation has been particularly pronounced in West Africa. 
Whereas Paris focused first on its traditional sphere of influence, it has also increasingly 
extended its cooperation to Anglophone and Lusophone West Africa. As a result, Paris has 
become an important security partner for ECOWAS. Thereby, France has not only supported 
the capacity-building of West African armed forces, but also provided operational support to 
ECOWAS peace operations. Therefore, Paris reorganised its institutional structure for 
military cooperation, launched a capacity-building programme, and has increasingly 
cooperated with the United States, the UN and, especially, its European partners. 
France begun to reform its military cooperation to support the capacity-building of 
African armed forces in 1997. At that time, the AU had not yet substituted the largely 
ineffective Organisation of African Unity (OAU), so the focus was initially on the Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs). The priority was first given to France’s traditional allies, the 
francophone member states of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). 
But in line with its new approach towards the African continent, France wanted to move 
beyond the pré carré. Therefore, and because the Nigerian-led ECOWAS was the most active 
African peacekeeper, the cooperation was slowly extended to most of the region (Bagayoko-
Penone 2001, 161, 163, 166-167). This was supposed to allow France to be in tune with the 
regionalisation and Africanization of the African security architecture (Gnanguenon 2007, 
162). 
As a result of these developments, political infighting, and in order to put the new 
approach into practice, in 1998, the Military Cooperation Mission was replaced by the 
Direction of Military and Defence Cooperation (La Lettre du Continent 19 November 1998), 
which in 2009 was renamed Direction of Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD). The 
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DCSD, which is situated in the Foreign Ministry and composed of diplomats, military 
personnel, policemen, and civil protection experts, is responsible for the ‘structural 
cooperation’. Thereby, it cooperates with the Armed Forces Staff and the different services, 
and the Direction for International Cooperation (Interior Ministry), which are responsible for 
the ‘operational cooperation’. In sub-Saharan Africa, the DCSD focuses on capacity-building 
and peacekeeping, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, the 
rule of law, domestic security, civil protection, arms and technology transfers, and privileges 
the partnership with regional organisations (DCSD 2011). The operational cooperation relies 
on the defence attachés within the French embassies, and the prepositioned forces, which 
help to support and train the regional brigades for the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF), as 
well as any other potentially deployed ad hoc African forces. Meanwhile, together with its 
international and European partners, the DCSD supports three peacekeeping training schools 
in Africa, of which two – the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye in Bamako 
and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – are in West Africa 
(Coopération de sécurité et de défense 2015). Moreover, it oversees the Ecoles Nationales à 
Vocation Régionale (ENVR), which France began to establish in 1997 in partnership with 
African countries to offer general and specialised military training to middle- and senior-
ranking African officers (Patry 2012, 172-175). Out of a total of 16 such schools, 9 are in 
ECOWAS member states (DCSD 2012). 
Within this evolving security cooperation framework, France has focused on the 
RECAMP programme and concept. Launched in 1998, it aims to build up African 
peacekeeping capacities. Its establishment was part of a general trend in the late 1990s, which 
also saw the creation of American and British capacity-building programmes (Berman 2002). 
The Americans, the British, and the French have since sought to harmonize and further 
multilateralize their programmes (Chafer and Cumming 2010, 1138). The RECAMP concept 
is not set in stone, but has continuously been adapted to the changing international 
environment and African peacekeeping landscape. The programme contains a bilateral and a 
multilateral pillar, since it operates in partnership with both individual states and regional 
organisations. Yet the cooperation with the AU and the RECs is important, especially since 
one of the major long-term aims has been to help with the establishment of the ASF. 
Therefore, the French have placed liaison officers with the AU and the RECs (Gnanguenon 
2007, 170). Although the French welcome the participation of non-francophone countries in 
RECAMP, for obvious historical reasons, the majority of the participants have come from 
France’s traditional sphere of influence. In order to prevent accusations of a francophone 
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bias, and to share the financial burden, since 2008 France has also applied the RECAMP 
doctrine together with its European partners at the continental level under the label 
EURORECAMP (Chafer and Cumming 2010, 1139; EU 2009). 
With RECAMP, France intervenes in the capacity-building of African peacekeeping 
forces through three courses of action: training of middle- and senior ranking officers; 
support to the training or organisation of staff, units, and institutions that intervene in the 
African Peace and Security Architecture, notably through training exercises; and operational 
support to contingents in peacekeeping operations. The training of African officers takes 
place either in France itself at the War School or the Institute of Advanced Studies in 
National Defence (IHEDN), or in Africa at the ENVRs (La Lettre du Continent 16 and 25 
November 1999). The second course of action consists of tactical operational training for 
staff and units through a series of bilateral and regional exercises at brigade level. As for 
operational support, France sends specialist detachments to help with operational 
preparations; provides logistical support and materiel from its depots in Africa for the actual 
deployment; and continues to provide logistical, technical, and material assistance once an 
African force is deployed. This does not, however, preclude the deployment of elite or special 
units to help African troops (Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et 
d’expérimentations 2011; Le Pautremat 2012, 190-197). Moreover, prior to the launch of 
Operation Licorne in 2002, it was assumed that the capacity-building under RECAMP would 
render substantial French interventions unnecessary. But thereafter, RECAMP “was 
redefined”, according to Bruno Charbonneau, “as complementing French ‘peacekeeping’ 
(direct military intervention) and traditional training of African armed forces (indirect 
intervention)” (2008, 113). Consequently, the unilateral or, bilateral pillar of France’s African 
strategy has remained intact with RECAMP. This has also been evident in France’s 
operational training and support of ECOWAS. 
In addition to the training offered in military schools in France and West Africa, the 
French have conducted operational exercises with ECOWAS, and armed forces of its 
individual member states. At the regional level, examples are the French support of the 
Guidimakha exercise at the border of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal in 1998, and the Bénin 
exercise in 2004, which marked the establishment of the ECOWAS joint force (La Lettre du 
Continent, 26 February 1998; Etat-major interarmées de force et d’entrainement 2004; 
Zecchini 2004). Moreover, France has also teamed up with its European partners, notably the 
United Kingdom and the EU. Together with the British, in 2000, the French supported the 
map exercise Blue Pelican at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and, in 2007, they funded 
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an ECOWAS military training exercise. A year later, they then participated, alongside the 
EU, in the first exercise to assess the readiness of the ECOWAS Standby Force (Chafer 2013, 
245). RECAMP has involved, however, also bilateral operational training, such as the 
Franco-Ivorian Sassandra exercise in 1999 (Le Hunsec 2009, 100-103). 
Meanwhile, France has also supported ECOWAS peace operations. In the late 1990s, 
the French Armed Forces provided logistical, material, and operational support to ECOMOG 
in Guinea-Bissau. The French Armed Forces deployed the West African peacekeeping force, 
which was equipped with materiel from France’s depot in Dakar (Berman 2003, 207; La 
Lettre du Continent 3 December 1998). Although the ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau 
was largely a failure, at least its deployment was relatively swift. In the Ivorian case, by 
contrast, political, logistical, and financial difficulties delayed the arrival of ECOWAS 
troops. This allowed the already deployed French Licorne Force to take on the peacekeeping 
role and, as a corollary, France to remain the ultimate arbiter. When ECOMICI eventually 
began to deploy in greater numbers in spring 2003, France provided financial, logistical, 
material and, especially, operational support. (Sada 2003, 328; Serequeberhan 2006, 325). 
The presence of an ECOWAS force, however ineffective it was, provided at least a fig leaf 
for the Africanization pillar of France’s reformed African strategy. Yet the direct intervention 
of Licorne could also be interpreted as the failure of France’s capacity-building programme 
(Smith 2004). 
Indeed, the ECOWAS operations in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrated 
not only that the West African peacekeepers were dependent on external, notably French 
support, but also that they were still unable to fulfil their mission (Augé 2008, 49-50). It thus 
has to be questioned whether the French capacity-building efforts have been appropriate to 
further the Africanization of peacekeeping, and thereby enable ECOWAS to be a 
peacekeeper in its own right. The problem is that the programme does not do away with 
African dependence. The reliance on both French theoretical and operational support is built 
into the programme (N’Diaye 2009, 18). Admittedly, and as the following examples of the 
Ivorian and the Malian crises illustrate, ECOWAS member states have also been responsible 
for their organisation’s peacekeeping failures. Nevertheless, according to Tony Chafer, 
“France has made it clear that, while it does want to transfer responsibilities to Africans, […] 
it has no intention of leaving” (Chafer 2013, 250). 
 
A Flawed Partnership? 
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When Sarkozy arrived in the Elysée in 2007, France’s new African strategy was well in 
place. Moreover, the capacity-building programme had already been running for a decade. 
Yet the new French President was not willing to simply carry on with the status quo, but 
promised to strengthen the multilateral pillar, and thereby further reduce the bilateral pillar of 
France’s African policy. Eventually, however, the forceful intervention in Côte d’Ivoire had 
not only the opposite effect, but also came instead of an African solution. When Hollande 
succeeded Sarkozy, he also promised a break with past policies, and announced an equal 
partnership with African security actors. But again, a major crisis – this time in Mali – was 
met with a French, rather than an African solution. Nevertheless, in both cases the French 
worked in partnership with ECOWAS, either at a political or a military level, or both. France 
and ECOWAS are, however, unequal partners, and in the wake of both the Ivorian and the 
Malian crises, the French have reasserted their predominant security role in West Africa. 
France’s interests in the region have been too strong to entrust them to what Paris sees as a 
politically incohesive and militarily weak organisation. 
Therefore, the option for direct intervention has always been left open. Admittedly, 
Sarkozy promised a mainly humanitarian and multilateral approach towards Africa, and that 
France would help to strengthen African peacekeeping capacities, refrain from intervention in 
domestic power struggles, revise the bilateral defence agreements to make them more 
transparent, and reduce the number of French troops in Africa (Sarkozy 2007, 151-152). 
Indeed, his government began with the revision of the defence agreements and troop 
reductions in Africa. Meanwhile, however, the 2008 defence white paper made it clear that 
France had major interests in Africa, and would be willing to do whatever it took to protect 
them, especially since Paris saw itself in competition for influence and resources with other, 
notably ‘Asian’ powers. According to this strategy, Africa was of prime strategic interest, 
because of its human and economic potential, as well as its natural resources. Parts of the 
continent remained, however, confronted with protracted conflicts, which hampered not only 
Africa’s economic development, but also provoked migratory waves and crime affecting 
Europe. In order to remedy this situation, France, together with its European partners, was 
supposed to help build up African crisis management and peacekeeping capacities, and to 
address African security within a multilateral framework. But simultaneously, the white 
paper also had a more interventionist language. Not only did it endorse the responsibility to 
protect principle, but it also left the door open for unilateral interventions to protect French 
nationals, implement bilateral defence agreements, and protect national interests (République 
française 2008, 44-46, 71-72, 114-115, 122-123). France’s role in the denouement of the 
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Ivorian post-electoral crisis in 2011 forcefully demonstrated that it was still ready to 
intervene directly, if considered necessary, even though it was in a multilateral framework 
and with African diplomatic support. Yet the intervention of the Licorne Force only came in 
reaction to African inaction. 
At first, it seemed as if ECOWAS took control of the crisis management. In response 
to Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to accept his defeat in the elections of late 2010, and vacate the 
presidency for Alassane Ouattara, a group of West African states led by Nigeria wanted 
ECOWAS to play a key role in the resolution of the crisis (IISS 2011, 291-292). On 24 
December 2010, the West African organisation threatened to oust Gbagbo by force if 
necessary (ECOWAS 2010). This proved, however, to be an empty threat. Even though the 
ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff examined the possibility of intervention (Le Monde 29 December 
2010), the organisation’s various heads of state and government could not agree on a peace 
operation. The main advocate for a West African peacekeeping force was the Nigerian 
President, Goodluck Jonathan, who hoped that it would allow him to strengthen his country’s 
international position. Thereby, he received the support from Burkinabé President Blaise 
Compaoré, who feared the sudden and uncontrolled return of millions of his compatriots; the 
President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, who wanted to protect Senegalese economic 
interests; and the President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Koroma, who upheld the flag of 
democracy. This group was, however, opposed by Gambia, which simply refused to 
participate; Liberia, which feared that it could lead to a massive influx of refugees and 
regional destabilisation; Guinea, which was absorbed by domestic affairs; and, especially, 
Benin, Ghana, and Togo, which, despite claiming to be neutral, were close to Gbagbo 
(Interviews with Western diplomats, Abidjan, 22 and 24 May 2012; Rouppert 2012, 20-21). 
Furthermore, ECOWAS lacked the financial and military means to rapidly mobilise and 
deploy an effective peacekeeping force (Interview with Western diplomat, Abidjan, 23 May 
2012; Hofnung 2011, 163). Consequently, a regional peace operation did not materialise, and 
on 10 February 2011, ECOWAS officially refocused its attention on finding a political 
solution to the crisis (ECOWAS 10 February 2011). The AU, meanwhile, even struggled to 
find a common position towards the Ivorian crisis, and the military option was never 
seriously considered (La Lettre du Continent 23 December 2010 and 13 January 2011; 
Interview with Western diplomat, Abidjan, 24 May 2012). 
The hopes of France, which from the beginning had supported an ECOWAS or AU 
solution to the Ivorian crisis, were thus disappointed (Guibert and Nougayrède 2010). As a 
result, Sarkozy began to prepare the ground for a joint UN-French military intervention to 
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halt the spiral of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, and thereby protect French economic interests and 
expatriates. ECOWAS member states, notably Nigeria, proved to be important political 
partners in this process. On the one hand, they were helpful in overcoming South African 
resistance to the recognition of Ouattara as the rightful president of Côte d’Ivoire within the 
AU (AU 10 March 2011). On the other, on 25 March 2011, ECOWAS passed a resolution 
that called on the UN Security Council to enable UNOCI “to use all necessary means to 
protect life and property, and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power” to Ouattara 
(ECOWAS 25 March 2011). This allowed France to overcome Chinese and Russian 
opposition in the UN Security Council to push through Resolution 1975, which, in addition to 
the recognition of Ouattara as the legitimate president and condemning Gbagbo, authorised 
UNOCI and the French Licorne Force “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to 
protect civilians” (UN 30 March 2011). A few days later, Licorne and, to a lesser extent, 
UNOCI, intervened in the battle for Abidjan, brought down Gbagbo, and installed Ouattara in 
power (Wyss 2014, 140-142). The ECOWAS resolution of 25 March, and the diplomatic 
support of leading West African states within the AU, had been instrumental in enabling 
France to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire with a high degree of international legitimacy. 
Eventually, however, it was France, and not the West African organisation that brought the 
post-electoral crisis to an end. 
In Mali, the partnership went beyond the political, and extended to the military level. 
Despite important efforts by ECOWAS and France’s preference for an African solution, it 
was French, and not West African troops, who had the decisive impact on the ground. When 
Hollande assumed office in mid-May 2012, the Malian crisis was already in full swing. It was 
in response to this crisis that he refined his African policy, which had significant resemblance 
to that of Sarkozy. But in contrast to his predecessor, he made Mali a priority. As argued by 
Charbonneau, “it was the crucial French diplomatic and military efforts that transformed Mali 
into an ‘international’ problem” (Charbonneau 2014, 197). Yet initially, in line with 
Hollande’s advocacy for an equal partnership, Paris supported African, notably West African 
responses to the crisis. 
ECOWAS was quick in condemning the March 2012 coup, which laid bare Bamako’s 
loss of control of the northern part of Mali to the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (MNLA), and other groups with links to Al-Qaeda. In late March, ECOWAS called 
for an immediate return to constitutional rule, and threatened the junta in Bamako with the 
use of force (ECOWAS 27 March 2012; Le Monde 28 March 2012). But shortly afterwards, 
the need for intervention appeared less urgent, because the organisation’s mediation efforts 
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led in early April to a framework agreement, which set out a transition period for the return to 
constitutional rule. ECOWAS then shifted its attention to the northern armed groups. In mid-
April, it decided to set up the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA) to restore territorial 
integrity and constitutional order. But MICEMA never went beyond the drawing board, 
because of the Malian junta’s hostility to the presence of West African troops in Bamako, 
disagreements within ECOWAS, the failure to win over Mali’s neighbours Algeria and 
Mauritania, logistical and financial constraints, as well as the lack of military capabilities and 
capacities (Théroux-Bénoni 2014, 172-175). 
In light of this impasse, the AU began to play a more active role from June 2012 
onwards by trying to transform the West African response into a continental one (Théroux-
Bénoni 2014, 175). Meanwhile, France also began to play an active role. On the one hand, it 
drummed up support for an African intervention in Mali within the region and the UN and, 
on the other, it provided military planners to ECOWAS and the AU (Weiss and Welz 2014, 
896; Jeune Afrique 26 July 2012). This support was necessary, especially after the UN 
Security Council had refused to authorise an ECOWAS force in early July 2012 (AP 6 July 
2012). Moreover, according to the French, intervention was “unavoidable”, but they were not 
supposed to take the military lead (Le Monde 7 August 2012). With the help of France and, to 
a lesser degree, the AU, ECOWAS thus continued to plan for action. In light of the 
deteriorating security situation in Mali, this seemed increasingly urgent, and in early autumn, 
Malian interim President Dioncounda Traoré called for an ECOWAS intervention (Ahmed 15 
August 2012; Roger 5 September 2012). Even though the AU and ECOWAS increasingly 
disputed the leadership of the mission, they wanted to move swiftly, and called on the UN 
Security Council to authorise an African, West African-led intervention. But the UN Security 
Council, especially the United States, and even France were not yet convinced about the 
feasibility of the mission. On the initiative of the French, who aimed for a rapid intervention, 
in October, the Security Council gave ECOWAS and the AU 45 days to come up with a more 
realistic plan (Jeune Afrique 27 September, 1 and 11 October 2012; UN 12 October 2012). 
Under the aegis of the AU and with sizeable support from France, ECOWAS thus refined its 
plans and member states officially pledged troops for the operation. Finally, on 20 December, 
US resistance was overcome, and the UN Security Council authorized what had become, not 
least because of the increasing involvement of the AU, the African-led International Support 
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) (Le Monde 12 November 2012; Jeune Afrique 7 December 2012; 
UN 20 December 2012). 
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This did not mean, however, that the deployment of AFISMA was imminent. The 
hopes of the French, who aimed for a deployment in early 2013, and therefore pledged 
logistical, technical, and intelligence support, were unrealistic (Jeune Afrique, 24 December 
2012). Firstly, the chronically underfunded ECOWAS, as well as the AU, lacked the 
necessary financial resources. Secondly, the UN was unwilling to provide the required funds 
and logistical support. Thirdly, ECOWAS did not have the military capacity to intervene, and 
neither did the Malian army, which was supposed to take the lead in the ‘reconquest’ of 
Northern Mali. Fourthly, the efforts were hampered by a lack of coordination and tensions 
between AU and ECOWAS. Finally, those who held the reins of power in Bamako never 
really wanted to host an ECOWAS-led operation (Théroux-Bénoni 2014, 175-176; Weiss and 
Welz 2014, 897, 900; Vines 2013, 105, 108). As a result, on 10 January 2013, when the 
Islamist Groups – Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad, and al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb – launched their pre-emptive offensive towards the South, they were met by 
French, and not African forces. 
The French Armed Forces had planned for this eventuality (Adam 2013, 12), and the 
Islamist offensive tipped the balance in favour of Operation Serval, which was motivated by 
a set of nine reasons. First, there was the absence of an African solution. Second, the EU and 
its member states did not share France’s threat perception, and were thus largely uninterested. 
Third, the UN was reluctant to make a substantial commitment. Fourth, against the 
background of the economic crisis and with a new defence white paper in the making, the 
armed forces wanted to demonstrate their usefulness, and thereby forestall defence budget 
cuts. Fifth, and related to the previous point, the armed forces had the ear of the President 
through the Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, and the President’s Military Chief of 
Staff, General Benoît Puga. Sixth, not only the Malian government itself, but also African 
leaders, notably Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, Macky Sall of Senegal, and Alpha Condé of 
Guinea, favoured a French intervention. Seventh, the crisis was seen by Paris as a threefold 
security threat to France and Europe, because it favoured the spread of Islamist terrorism and 
organised crime, and could unleash a wave of refugees. Eighth, Paris wanted to protect its 
economic interests in the region, notably the access to uranium in Niger. Finally, as the major 
military power in the region, and in line with its aspiration of grandeur, there was also a sense 
of responsibility that pushed the French towards intervention (Marchal 2013, 488-489; Weiss 
and Welz 2014, 897, 900, 903; Chafer 2014, 522-524). 
France’s almost immediately successful military campaign was largely welcomed by 
the Malian population and the international community, and at last led to the deployment of 
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AFISMA (Avezov and Smit 2014; AFP 13 January 2013). The mostly West African troops 
arrived, however, only slowly, and once deployed, they proved to be largely ineffective and 
had to rely on French support (Carayol 2013; Jeune Afrique 10 April 2013). Yet Paris did not 
want to shoulder the responsibility for the pacification and stabilisation of Mali, and was thus 
eager to withdraw most of its troops as soon as possible. Therefore, Paris lobbied the UN to 
reinforce and take over AFISMA. Eventually, on 25 April 2013, the UN Security Council 
established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
which succeeded AFISMA on 1 July 2013 (Le Monde 25 January 2013; UN 25 April 2013). 
France has remained, however, militarily present in the Sahel region. Moreover, since 
Operation Serval, the military withdrawal from Africa is, for the moment, definitely off the 
table. Instead, Paris has decided to reinforce its security role on the African continent, notably 
in West Africa. The French defence White Paper of 2013 was heavily influenced by France’s 
forceful intervention in Mali. While it largely builds on the preceding version of 2008, it has 
significantly increased the strategic importance of Africa at the expense of Asia. Paris is still 
supposed to privilege a multilateral framework, and to further the Africanization of crisis 
management. Simultaneously, however, France has to retain the capacity to intervene, if 
necessarily, single-handedly – not least to help France’s African allies. Therefore, the 
bilateral defence agreements with African countries, strong rapid reaction forces in the 
metropole, and pre-positioned forces in Africa are deemed essential (République française 
2013). 
Yet the partnership with African security actors is supposed to be strengthened. Paris 
is determined to cooperate with the AU and RECs on African security issues, and therefore to 
continue to help building up their military capacities. This was the tenor of the 2013 Elysée 
Summit on Peace and Security in Africa, where Hollande pledged to support the capacity-
building of regional African organisations (Le Monde 5 December 2013; Roger 2013). The 
French are not, however, naïve about the Africanization of peacekeeping in Africa. The 
recent crises have demonstrated that after almost two decades of capacity-building, African 
forces are still not in a position to deal with major crises on their own. Therefore, France has 
strengthened the unilateral pillar – i.e. the capacity and capability to intervene directly in 
African conflicts – of its African strategy. This allows, if France’s national interests are at 
stake, intervention in Africa, preferably alongside such partners as ECOWAS but, if 
necessary, alone (Fromion and Rouillard 2014; Commission de la défense nationale 2014; Le 
Monde 4 February 2013). Consequently, France has retained a strong military presence in 
Africa, where about 10,000 French soldiers are in service at five bases, and a maritime 
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presence in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as Operation Barkhane, the follow-up operation in 
Mali, and in the Central African Republic, where a limited number of troops have remained 
after the completion of Operation Sangaris. Two of these bases (Dakar and Abidjan), one 
operation (Barkhane), and the maritime presence are not only in West Africa, but are also 
supposed to cooperate with ECOWAS (Carayol 2015; Ministère des Armées 6 June 2017). 
 
Conclusion 
During the last and, especially, in the current decade, France’s forceful interventions in West 
Africa have either overshadowed, or come instead of ECOWAS peace operations. This does 
not necessarily mean, however, that there is rivalry between France and ECOWAS member 
states, and that they cannot and do not work in partnership. At the theoretical level, there is a 
high degree of convergence between France and ECOWAS. Since the 1990s, while the West 
African organisation has emerged as a security and peacekeeping actor, Paris has sought to 
multilateralize and Africanize its security policy, and to refrain from direct military 
intervention. In addition, France’s capacity-building efforts in West Africa, notably through 
RECAMP, provide a practical basis for a security partnership. Within this framework, the 
French military has also provided material, logistical, and operational support to ECOWAS 
deployments. Moreover, even in response to the Ivorian and Malian crises, France has 
cooperated with ECOWAS, or at least groupings of its member states, at the political and/or 
military level. Yet as these crises also illustrate, France remains the predominant security 
actor in the region, and the theoretical convergence does not necessarily translate into 
practice. In reality, the partnership is thus not particularly effective, and does not help to 
enable ECOWAS to take care of its region. 
The reasons for the practical divergence are manifold. Firstly, the political, strategic, 
and economic interests of France and ECOWAS member states are not necessarily aligned. 
Paris evaluates a given crisis in light of its priorities, which are to protect French economic 
interests and citizens in the region, as well as to safeguard France’s security by maintaining 
regional stability, and combating terrorism and international crime. Admittedly, ECOWAS 
member states are also interested in regional stability. But as the Malian and Ivorian crises 
illustrated, they have their individual political, economic, and security concerns. This does 
not only make it difficult to find common ground with France, but also between ECOWAS 
member states themselves. This problem is further compounded by France’s changing and 
evolving security policy. While the overall thrust of France’s African strategy remains 
relatively constant, different Presidents have had different priorities. Secondly, and this is 
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directly related to the first point, the character and location of crises varies, and thus lead to 
different reactions and responses from the concerned actors. This was evident during the 
Malian crisis, when the situation was considered more urgent in Paris than in numerous West 
African capitals. Similarly, and this leads to the third point, the situation in Mali did not 
rapidly lead to a consensual response in Addis Ababa, Brussels, and New York. Yet the 
support of the African and international community plays an important enabling role in the 
Franco-ECOWAS peacekeeping partnership. Fourthly, the international and French capacity-
building programmes – notably RECAMP – have to be effective, which, as it seems, they 
have not been. This is not only due to the character of the programmes, but also to their 
inefficient and ineffective implementation by ‘gatekeeper’ states. This leads to the final and 
probably most important point, the inequality of the military and financial capabilities and 
capacities between France and ECOWAS member states. Paris has, if considered necessary 
and willing, the military and financial means available to intervene single-handedly – at least 
for a limited period of time. ECOWAS member states, by contrast, remain both militarily and 
financially relatively impotent. In the cases that ECOWAS has been able to deploy a peace 
operation, it has remained dependent on operational support from France and other non-
African partners. But even this often sizeable support has not necessarily allowed West 
African forces to be effective on the ground. The picture was even worse in the cases of the 
Ivorian and Malian crises, in reaction to which ECOWAS did not manage to deploy an 
operation at all, or only latterly in the wake of a French intervention. Despite almost two 
decades of capacity-building, West African armed forces lack the military capacities to 
address a major crisis. At a pecuniary level, both ECOWAS as an organisation and its 
individual members lack the financial means – as so many African organisations – to conduct 
peace operations. More worryingly, and as argued by David Ambrosetti and Romain 
Esmenjaud, African states have often lacked the political will to finance their respective 
regional organisation’s security role, and the participation of some in peacekeeping has been 
motivated by a strategy of extraversion, a desire to obtain a ‘geopolitical rent’ (2014). 
Simultaneously, both the financial and the military dependency are so entrenched in the 
Franco-African and, more generally, North-South relationship, that genuine Africanization 
seems to remain a distant ideal. 
Nevertheless, despite its flaws and inequalities, as well as frequent divergence, the 
peacekeeping partnership between France and ECOWAS is increasingly close. In response to 
crises, they have cooperated at the diplomatic level, and shared the burden on the ground. 
France does the heavy lifting, the peace enforcement (Tardy 2014, 785-786), while West 
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African troops act as peacekeepers, either under the ECOWAS or the UN flag, and thereby 
provide France with legitimacy and the fig leaf of Africanization. With a certain degree of 
independence, ECOWAS can also deploy operations in reaction to smaller crises, such as the 
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (Le Monde 27 April 2012). This burden-sharing 
approach is not limited to West Africa, as illustrated by France’s involvement in the Central 
African Republic with Operation Sangaris (Tardy 2013), and is likely to be reinforced in light 
of France’s frustration with the EU and, to a lesser extent, the UN in Africa (Koepf 2012). 
Finally, however, the privileged partners do not have to be regional organisations, but can 
also be more appropriate ad hoc coalitions, such as the G-5 in the Sahel region (Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) that cooperate with Operation Barkhane (Ministère 
de la Défense 2014). Ultimately, France cooperates with what it considers to be the most 
suitable partner in a given situation, whether this is a regional organisation, an ad hoc 
coalition, or an individual state. This seems inevitable, because security issues can have a 
national, transnational, regional, or transregional character. Consequently, while there is 
theoretical convergence between the security policies and roles of France and ECOWAS, the 
character of an individual crisis, the international and African contexts, the interests of Paris 
and West African capitals, as well as their military and financial capabilities and capacities 
do not necessarily align. This can either lead to a flawed partnership with ECOWAS, or 
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